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Abstract 
The metamorphic malware variants with the same malicious behavior (family), can obfuscate themselves to look diơerent from 
each other. This variation in structure lead to a huge signature database for traditional signature matching techniques to detect 
them. In order to eơective and eƥcient detection of malwares in large amounts of executables, we need to partition these ¿les 
into groups which can identify their respective families. In addition, the grouping criteria should be chosen such a way that, it can 
also be applied to unknown ¿les encounter on computer for classi¿cation. This paper discusses the study of malwares and benign 
executables in groups to detect unknown malwares with high accuracy. We studied sizes of malwares generated by three popular 
second generation malwares (metamorphic malwares) creator kits viz. G2, PS-MPC and NGVCK, and observed that the size 
variation in any two generated malwares from same kit is not much. Hence we grouped the executables on the basis of malware 
sizes by using Optimal k-Means Clustering algorithm and used these obtained groups to select promising features for training 
(Random forest, J48, LMT, FT and NBT) classi¿ers to detect variants of malwares or unknown malwares. We ¿nd that detection 
of malwares on the basis of their respected ¿le sizes gives accuracy up to 99.11% from the classi¿ers. 
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1. Introduction 
As new variants of malwares getting evolve every day, malwares defense becoming increasingly difficult task in 
detecting malware and protecting computers systems from them1. Recently 11 zero-day vulnerabilities reported 
during the month of August while 6 of these were reported in industrial control systems2. Even state sponsored 
highly skilled hackers are developing customized malwares to disrupt industries and for military espionage3. Many 
of countries continue to incur most costly data breaches. Among them two countries had the highest cost from data 
breach4 (the U.S. at $5.4 million and Germany at $4.8 million).  
Anti-malware industries are facing a major challenge of continuously increase of huge data, which need to be 
checked for potential malicious content. Microsoft reports that there real-time detection anti-malware products are 
present on over 160 Million computing devices throughout the globe and they daily analyze tens of millions of data 
files as potential malware5. Reason behind these high volumes of different files is that the malware authors introduce 
metamorphism to the malicious components. Metamorphic malware represent the next class of virus that can create 
an entirely new variant after reproduction3. The new variant produced is in no-way similar to the original variant 
which lead a huge increase in the malwares count.  
In order to detect them with high accuracy, we need to group them to identify their respective families. In 
addition, such grouping criteria may be applied to new test executables to classify it to malware. In this paper we 
studied three popular second generation malwares creator kits viz. G2, PS-MPC and NGVCK and found that the 
size variation in any two generated malwares from same kit does not differ much. Hence in this work we grouped 
the executables on the basis of malware sizes by using optimal k-Means Clustering algorithm and promising features 
are selected separately from each groups. Further these obtained features are tested on random forest, J48, Logistic 
Model Trees (LMT), functional trees (FT) and naive bayes tree (NBT) classifier using machine learning technique.  
The paper is organized as follow, in next section related work is discussed, In section 3 we present our approach, 
The section 4 discuss the experimental results and finally section 5 contains the conclusion and future directions.  
 
2. Related work 
The first virus was created in 19706 and since then there is a strong contest between the attackers and defenders. 
To combat the threats/attacks from the second generation malwares, Schultz et al. (2001) was the first to introduce 
the concept of data mining to classify the malwares7. In 2005 Karimet al.8 addressed the tracking of malware 
evolution based on opcode sequences and permutations. O. Henchiri et al.(2006) proposed a hierarchical feature 
extraction algorithm and used ID3, j48, Naive Bayes and SMO classifier and obtained maximum of 92.56% 
accuracy9. In year 2005, Karimet al.8 addressed the tracking of malware evolution based on opcode sequences and 
permutations. O. Henchiri et al.(2006) proposed a hierarchical feature extraction algorithm and used ID3, j48, Naive 
Bayes and SMO classifier and obtained maximum of 92.56% accuracy9. Bilar (2007) uses small dataset to examine 
the opcode frequency distribution difference between malicious and benign code10and observed that some opcodes 
seen to be a stronger predictor of frequency variation. In 2008, Yanfang Ye et. al.11 applied association rules on API 
execution sequences for classifying the malwares. In 2008, Tian et al.12 classified the Trojan using function length 
frequency and shown that the function length along with its frequency is significant in identifying malware family 
and can be combined with other features for fast and scalable malware classification. Moskovitchet al.13 compared 
the different classifiers by byte-sequence n-grams (3, 4, 5 or 6). Among the classifiers they studied BDT, DT and 
ANN out-performed NB, BNB and SVM classifiers, exhibiting lower false positive rates. In year 2008, Siddiquiet 
al.14 used variable length instruction sequence for detecting worms in the wild. They tested their method on a data 
set of 2774 (1444 worms and 1330 benign files) and got 95.6% detection accuracy. In 2009 S. Momina Tabish15 
used 13 different statical features computed on 1, 2, 3 and 4 gram by analyzing byte-level file content for 
classification of malwares. In year 2010, Bilal Mehdi et. al.16 used hyper grams (generalized n-gram) and obtained 
87.85% detection accuracy and claimed no false alarm. ChatchaiLiangboonprakong et al. (2013) proposed a 
classification of malware families based on N-grams sequential pattern features17. They used DT, ANN and SVM 
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classifier and obtained good accuracy. Santos et al. in year 2011 pointed out that supervised learning requires a 
significant amount of labeled executables for both malware and benign programs, which is difficult to obtain, hence 
they proposed a semi-supervised learning method for detecting unknown malwares, which does not require a large 
amount of labeled data18. They obtained 86% of accuracy by labeling only 50% of the selected data set. In 
subsequent paper19 in 2013, they used Term Frequency for modeling different classifiers and found that SVM 
outperform with accuracy of 92.92% and 95.90% respectively for one opcode and two opcode sequence length 
respectively. Recently (2014) Zahra Salehi et al. construct feature set by extracting API calls used in the executables 
for the classification of malwares20. 
3. Our approach 
Fig. 1 represents the procedure to partition the dataset in groups, finding the promising features from each formed 
group and the classification of unknown malwares by using Random forest21, J4822, LMT23, FT24 and NBT25 
classifiers available in WEKA tool26. 
 
Fig.1.:Flow chart for the proposed method. 
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Fig.2.:Opcodes that have high difference of occurrence in malware and benign executables. 
3.1. Data preprocessing 
For the experimental analysis, we downloaded 11368 malwares from malacia-project27and collected 3151 benign 
programs (also verified from virustotal.com28) from different systems.  
Algorithm1: Selection of the Promising Features 
 
INPUT: Malwares and benign assembly codes, Nbĺ Total No. of benign in the cluster, Nmĺ Total No. of malware 
in the cluster, Nĺ Required No. of features.  
OUTPUT: Features for the analysis.  
  BEGIN 
  for all Malwares and benign data do 
  Compute the sum of Normalized frequency(fi) of each opcode oj.    
SFm (oj )  fi (oj ) / Max( f (oj ))¦  / Nm  
SFb (oj )  fi (oj ) / Max( f (oj ))¦  / Nb  
  end for 
  for all opcode oj do 
  Compute the difference D(oj) between the SFm(oj) and SFb(oj) for each opcode.  
  D(oj )  SFm (oj ) SFb (oj )  
  end for 
  return  N number of opcodes with highest D(o).  
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For the analysis we disassemble all collected executables to their assembly codes by objdump utility available 
in the Linux system and found 1147 unique opcodes, which we labeled with a fixed integer. viz. 1 Åaaa, 2 
Åaad,...., 1147 Åxsha256. 
We study the obtained opcodes occurrence in malwares and benign executable and found that many opcodes 
occurrences in malwares differ significantly from benign program, and vice versa (fig. 2). Hence, we obtained the 
promising features by computing the difference of normalized opcodes frequency between benign and malware 
executables as given in the algo. 1.  
3.2. Partitioning the executables in dataset  
We studied the malwares sizes generated by popular metamorphic malware generator kits viz. NGVCK29, PS-
MPC30 and G231 and found that size of the malwares generated by any one of the kits does not vary much (fig. 3). 
For efficient analysis and classification of advanced malwares in large amounts of executables, we used size of an 
executable as criteria for grouping the dataset. We partitioned the collected dataset into 9 groups by using optimal k-
Means Clustering algorithm. The number of clusters (value of K) is obtained by the Bayesian information 
criterion32. 
Fig.3.:Variation in the size of malwares generated by three 
different malware generators. 
 
Fig.4.:Detection accuracy by selectingmost promising number of 
features
4. Experimental analysis and results 
We have used machine learning to train and test the Random forest, J48, LMT, FT and NBT classifiers available  
Table 1. Number of executables in each cluster of malwares and benign dataset. 
Cluster No.  of malwares for training No.  of benign for training No.  of malwares for testing No. of benign for testing 
1 322 43 55 18 
2 1234 20 221 9 
3 1489 20 265 9 
4 714 71 128 13 
5 335 2227 61 402 
6 886 36 158 11 
7 2716 40 481 11 
8 1148 33 204 11 
9 18 156 4 21 
Total 8862 2646 1577 505 
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in WEKA tool (a collection of visualization tools and algorithms for data analysis and predictive modeling, together 
with graphical user interfaces for easy access to these functionality26). 
We have obtained 9 groups from the datasets, which are further divided into two sets. One of the sets is used to 
training the classifiers and other one is used to test the detection accuracy of trained classifiers. The training set 
consists of 8862 malwares and 2646 benign executables and for testing the classifiers 1577 malware 505 benign 
executables are taken. The number of malwares and benign executables for training and testing the classifiers are 
given in table 1. In this for robust results, we ensure that at least 15% of the executables in the cluster which are not 
used for training purpose are taken for the testing of the classifiers.  
 
Fig.5.:Detection accuracy obtainedby the 
classifiers on group 1. 
 
Fig.6.:Detection accuracy obtainedby the 
classifiers on group 2. 
 
Fig.7: Detection accuracy obtainedby the 
classifiers on group 3.
 
Fig.8: Detection accuracy obtainedby the 
classifiers on group 4. 
 
Fig.11: Detection accuracy obtainedby the 
classifiers on group 7. 
 
Fig.9: Detection accuracy obtainedby the 
classifiers on group 5. 
Fig.12: Detection accuracy obtainedby the 
classifiers on group 8. 
Fig.10: Detection accuracy obtainedby the 
classifiers on group 6. 
 
Fig.13: Detection accuracy obtainedby the 
classifiers on group 9.
 
To train the classifiers, first we have used the feature selection algorithm (1) to find the promising features for the 
detection of malwares for every partitioned group 1-9 and then trained the classifier. To measure the effectiveness of 
the five classifiers we used different number of features (20, 40, 60, 100) for the classification and monitored the 
accuracy of classifiers for each groups with providing the respective testing executables of the group. The detection 
accuracy of the classifier is calculated by the equation. 
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Accuracy(%)  TP TN
TM TB
u100  
 
(1) 
where,  
TPĺ True positive, the number of malwares correctly classified.  
TNĺ True negative, the number of benign correctly classified. 
TMĺ Total number of malwares. 
TBĺ Total number of benign. 
The plots (5 - 13) shows the performance of classifiers for each group with respect to different numbers of 
features provided to the classifiers. We took the best required features from each cluster and find that all the 
classifier overall performed with correctness of more than 98.21% of detection accuracy. NBT performed better then 
the other with 99.11% of detection accuracy (shown in fig. 4).  
5. Conclusion 
From the literature, we found that the obfuscation techniques in malware generation are becoming crucial for the 
classical signature matching approaches used in malwares detection systems. In order to be efficient in analyzing 
and classifying large amounts of executables for detection of unknown or metamorphic malwares, we have studied 
the malwares generated by three popular malware generator kits. We found the variation of size of malwares 
generated by these kits does not vary much. Thus on the basis of findings, we partitioning executables in 9 groups 
using Optimal k-Means Clustering algorithm on the sizes of malwares as a criteria. Then we discussed a statical 
analysis approach to detect unknown malwares for windows operating system by selecting features for each group 
separately by feature selection approach based on the difference of opcode occurrence among benign and malwares 
executable. We used a well known classifiers viz. Random forest, J48, LMT, FT and NBT for the classification of 
malwares and found that all of them perform with more than 98% of detection where as NBT give highest accuracy 
of 99.11%. The experiments suggest that the research direction is promising and the possible future work can be in-
depth study of malware generator kits by which we can able to keep a family of malware in one partitioned group 
and the classifier can attain the detection of unknown malwares with more accuracy. 
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